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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1673 
____________ 
 
SELVIN ROLANDO ESTRADA-ESTRADA, 
                        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
__________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A070-895-327) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 17, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 17, 2011 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Selvin Rolando Estrada-Estrada (“Estrada”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
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 Estrada, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States in January 
1990, without inspection.  In 1993, he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming a fear of persecution.  He was 
issued a Notice To Appear on September 24, 2007, placing him in removal proceedings.  
It is uncontested that he is removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) 
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States 
without being admitted or paroled.  In December 2008, Estrada applied for Special Rule 
Cancellation of Removal under Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act (“NACARA”), Pub. L. No. 105-100 § 203, 111 Stat. 2160, 
2196-2200 (November 17, 1997).  He also applied for voluntary departure under INA 
§ 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. 
On December 24, 2008, the Immigration Judge denied Estrada’s application for 
asylum and his application for Special Rule Cancellation.  The IJ granted Estrada sixty 
days to voluntarily depart, and, in the alternative, ordered him removed to Guatemala. 
 Estrada appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which stayed his voluntary 
departure.  On August 31, 2010, the Board dismissed Estrada’s appeal, finding it lacking 
in merit.  The Board granted him another 60 days to depart voluntarily.  In its written 
decision, the Board warned Estrada of the consequences of failing to depart during the 
voluntary departure period.  The Board also gave him notice of the effect of filing a post-
decision motion to reopen or petition for review on a grant of voluntary departure under 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3)(iii) (if alien files post-order motion to reopen or reconsider during 
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period allowed for voluntary departure, grant of voluntary departure shall terminate 
automatically and alternate order of removal will take effect immediately). 
Estrada did not depart the United States during the sixty-day voluntary departure 
period.  He did not ask the Board to withdraw its grant of voluntary departure during the 
sixty-day period.  He did not timely petition for review of the Board’s August 31, 2010 
decision. 
 On October 4, 2010, Estrada married a United States citizen and she filed an 
immediate relative visa petition on his behalf.  On November 22, 2010, day 83 of the 
90-day period for filing a motion to reopen, Estrada filed a motion to reopen with the 
Board, seeking to apply for adjustment of status, INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), based 
on the visa petition filed by his United States citizen spouse.  He also specifically 
requested to withdraw his request for voluntary departure, citing Dada v. Mukasey, 554 
U.S. 1 (2008) (alien may withdraw voluntary departure request as long as request is made 
within the voluntary departure period).  The Department of Homeland Security opposed 
the motion. 
On February 25, 2011, the Board denied Estrada’s motion to reopen, noting that he 
was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status for ten years because he did not 
voluntarily depart the United States.  Moreover, because he did not file his motion to 
reopen within the voluntary departure period, the grant of voluntary departure was not 
automatically terminated.  The Board also denied Estrada’s request to withdraw the 
voluntary departure grant, because he did not seek withdrawal before the expiration of the 
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voluntary departure period.  The Board reasoned that his circumstances did not match 
those of the alien in Dada. 
 Estrada has timely petitioned for review of the Board’s February 25, 2011 
decision.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 We will deny the petition for review.  We review the Board’s denial of a motion to 
reopen for abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 
314, 323 (1992).  The discretionary decision is not disturbed unless it is found to be 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2004).  The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen where it determines that the 
alien is not prima facie eligible for the underlying relief sought.  See Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988).  Under INA § 240B(d)(1)(B), 8 
U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B), an alien who fails to depart within the voluntary departure 
period is ineligible for adjustment of status for ten years.
1
  Estrada does not deny that he 
did not depart the United States within the sixty-day voluntary departure period. 
                                              
1
 The statute provides: 
(d) Civil penalty for failure to depart 
(1) In general  
Subject to paragraph (2), if an alien is permitted to depart voluntarily 
under this section and voluntarily fails to depart the United States within 
the time period specified, the alien--  
* * * * 
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 An alien who is subject to a removal order has 90 days after the issuance of a final 
removal order to file a motion to reopen proceedings.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  Estrada 
argues that his failure to depart during the 60-day voluntary departure period renders his 
statutory right to seek reopening within 90 days a nullity.  Petitioner’s Brief, at 9.  Dada 
addressed this very argument.  The Supreme Court held that an alien must be permitted to 
seek withdrawal of the grant of voluntary departure.  See id. at 20-21.  If the grant of 
voluntary departure is withdrawn, the alien then avoids the ten-year bar and may remain 
in the United States to pursue administrative relief.  See id.  However, the alien must seek 
withdrawal of the voluntary departure order before it expires.  See id. 
This latter requirement preserves the alien’s right to seek reopening while 
respecting the government’s interest in maintaining the advantages of the voluntary 
departure arrangement.  See id.  As the Board determined, Dada does not help Estrada 
because he did not request withdrawal of the order within the voluntary departure period.  
Under the regulation promulgated after Dada, “[i]f the alien files a post-decision motion 
to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure, the grant of 
voluntary departure shall be terminated automatically … and [t]he penalties for failure to 
depart voluntarily under section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply….”  8 C.F.R. 
                                                                                                                                                  
(B) shall be ineligible, for a period of 10 years, to receive any further 
relief under this section and sections 1229b, 1255, 1258, and 1259 of this 
title. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)(B). 
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§ 1240.26(b)(3)(iii).  The regulation is in accord with Dada and satisfies due process.  
Because Estrada did not avail himself of the opportunity presented by the regulation and 
Dada – by seeking withdrawal of his voluntary departure order in a timely manner – the 
Board did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
